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Autonomous Decisionmaking and
Social Choice: Examining the "Right
to Die"
BY DONALD L. BESCHIE*
INTRODUCTION
One of the strangest terms to gain acceptance in the legal
field is "the right to die." This phrase has been used to gather
into a single category a number of more specific claims of right,
including a right to commit suicide, a right to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment, and a right to authorize another
to engage in euthanasia, either by acting or refusing to act, with
respect to the holder of the right.'
The term "right" has been defined in a number of ways.
Much of western legal philosophy has focused on defining the
concept and locating its source.2 Despite their differences, all
mainstream definitions agree in one respect: an actual or alleged
right becomes manifest as a result of a claim. Unless someone
* Associate Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. B.A. 1973,
Fordham University, J.D. 1976, New York University School of Law, LL.M. 1983,
Temple University School of Law.
' See, e.g., G. GiusEz & J. BOYLE, LIFE AND DEATH wnm LIBERTY AND JUSTICE:
A CONTRIBUTION TO THE EU ASIA DEBATE (1979) (The authors, after an introductory
discussion of the "right to die" movement, address in separate chapters the refusal of
medical treatment, suicide, voluntary active euthanasia, nonvoluntary euthanasia, and
care of the noncompetent.); see also Symposium Panel, Is There a Right to Die?, 12
COLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 489, 490-91 (1976) [hereinafter Symposium Panel] (remarks
of Prof. Frank P. Grad).
Some commentators use the term more specifically, usually excluding nonvoluntary
euthanasia, often excluding active euthanasia, either voluntary or involuntary, and
often excluding or failing to address the question of suicide. See, e.g., Schimke, The
Natural Death Act: Protection for the Right to Die, 47 MONT. L. REv. 379 (1986);
Note, The Living Will: The Right to Death With Dignity, 26 CASE W. REs. 485 (1976).
2 See generally Hu.mA RIGHTS (NOMOS XXIII) (J. Pennock and J. Chapman,
eds., 1981).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
desires and seeks something, we have no cause even to discuss
whether that something is a right. A right is something valued
positively; it is a good. It is also something that someone else
seeks to deny to the claimant-something that could be with-
held. In the absence of these fundamental starting points, no
debate about rights can begin.
The strange nature of the term, if not the concept, "right
to die," is immediately apparent. Unlike liberty, equality, jus-
tice, a minimum standard of living, and just about any recog-
nized or arguable right,3 death is and almost always has been
viewed not as a good, but as perhaps the ultimate evil.4 Death
may be necessary, and may be accepted, but it is hardly some-
thing to be sought, at least not for its own sake. 5 And while
rulers have denied millions the experience of liberty, equality,
and other rights, even the most homespun philosophy recognizes
that death is the one thing that we all will certainly share.
Rights are sought as goods, and must be sought because they
may be withheld. Death is not a good, and it is inevitable. It is
I Constitutional law in the United States sees fundamental rights as generally
limited to negative rights, that is, to the right to be free of government compulsion.
Positive entitlements are recognized as rights in other constitutional or quasi-constitu-
tional documents, such as the United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948), and some state constitutions. See
Langdon & Kass, Homelessness in America: Looking for the Right to Shelter, 19
CoLum. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 305, 323-25 (1985). Positive entitlements also attain the
status of right through legislation, of course. But however created or defined, rights
are good; duties, their correlatives, are burdensome. See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
4 To be sure, philosophers dating back to the Stoics have argued that death
should not be feared. Such philosophies have been endorsed by Christian confidence
in a happy afterlife and a merciful God. However, these arguments are themselves
necessary only because of the overwhelming sense that death is an evil, a defeat. As
Robert Olson points out, St. Augustine's theology required him to condemn as sinful
his own very human grief at the death of his mother. And "as Christian existentialists
never weary of reminding us ... Christ's death upon the cross was preceded by a lapse
of faith and a tortured cry of despair: 'My God, my God why hast thou forsaken
me,"' R. OLsoN, AN INTRODUCTION TO EXISTENTIALISM 193 (1962).
1 Even the most idealized accounts of death draw the distinction between accep-
tance and happiness. Death is to be faced calmly and courageously, but with the
realization of the tragic nature of what is happening. In the Chanson de Roland,
Roland, dying the death of a hero "weeps and sighs, he cannot help himself." Another
hero, "Achilles did not fear death either, but in the underworld, his shade complained,
'I would rather be a stable boy and work for a poor farmer than reign over the dead,"'
P. ARms, THE HouR OF OuR DEATH 15 (1981).
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little wonder that the term "right to die" strikes a dissonant,
if not bizarre, note.
Of course, when we analyze the concept behind the term,
its dissimilarity to other rights is greatly reduced. A proponent
of the right to die, when asked what such a term could possibly
mean, will respond by choosing one or more of the specific,
death-related things mentioned above. In general, the right will
be defined as a claim to control the time and manner of death,
not merely to have it be a part of one's existence. Control over
the time and manner of one's death can more easily be viewed
as a positive goal, and such control can be denied to the
individual. To some extent this has always been so. The debate
over the legal status of suicide has a long history. 6 But modern
medical technology has made time and manner of death more
a matter of choice than ever before. Technology has also forced
the issues gathered under the label "right to die" into public
consciousness.7 Behind the suggestion of death as entitlement,
contained in the phrase "right to die," then, is actually the
more comfortable concept of freedom from interference in in-
dividual decisions about time and manner of death. The right
to die, it might be said, is therefore no more strange, either as
a term or a concept, than "liberty." Liberty, when understood
as a positive entitlement, comes perilously close to designating
the loneliness of Robinson Crusoe as the ideal life. But when
understood as merely a shorthand term to describe a measure
of freedom from interference by certain others in certain aspects
of life, "liberty" becomes attractive as a concept and useful as
a term. 8
6 The history of the ethical and legal debate is told, from a strong "pro-choice"
position, by Joseph Fletcher, who summarizes: "In classical times suicide was a tragic
option, for human dignity's sake. Then for centuries it was a sin. Then it became a
crime. Then a sickness. Soon it will become a choice again," Fletcher, In Defense of
Suicide in S. WALLACE & A. ESER, SUICIDE AND EUrHANASIA: THE RIGHTS OF PERSON-
HOOD 38, 50 (1982) [hereinafter SUICIDE AND EUtANASIA]. American jurisdictions have
been divided for many years over the criminality of suicide, attempted suicide, aiding
or inciting to commit suicide, see generally 83 C.J.S. Suicide §§ 1-6 (1953).
7 It has done so on a number of medical-legal issues. See Cowen, "In the Rear
and Limping a Little" Some Reflections on Medicine, Biotechnology and the Law: The
Roscoe Pound Lectures, 64 NEB. L. REv. 548 (1985).
a Contrast the attitudes toward, and definitions of, liberty, articulated in R.
DwoRucN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 259-78 (1977) and F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION
OF LmERTY 11-21 (1960).
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Still, a sense of uneasiness about the "right to die" persists.
If specific terms such as suicide and euthanasia are sufficiently
descriptive to sustain discussion of their substance (and the fact
that they have been for many years indicates that is true), why
has a less precise term emerged? Is it simply a matter of se-
mantic economy? If so, why this particular term? Or does the
choice of the term "right to die" have potentially serious, and
possibly negative, implications for the development of the con-
cept itself?
This Article contends that the use of the term "right to die"
is significant and that its use masks some extremely important
considerations involved in the current legal debate on the issue
of sustaining life. The term allows and encourages us to believe
that when society makes significant and painfully difficult de-
cisions about life and death, we are making no decision at all,
but merely deferring to individual autonomy. In short, it allows
us to mask decisions as non-decisions.
That is not to say that at least some of the ultimate conclu-
sions of the advocates of a "right to die" concerning when law
should and should not insist on prolonging life are incorrect.
But the question of whether that is so can best be made by
abandoning the illusion that we, as a society, are doing nothing
more than maintaining neutrality and deferring to individual
choice.
Part I of this Article will trace the evolution of the "right
to die" to its current place in American law. Part II will discuss
and evaluate the generally favorable reception that the concept
has received from commentators. Part III will elaborate on the
central argument of this Article, that intelligent legal debate on
the role of law in continuing or terminating medical treatment
requires that we abandon the term "right to die," and that we
limit, far more strictly than is now the case, the extent to which
we conceive of these questions as involving autonomous, rather
than social, decisions. Part IV suggests some alternative ways
to conceive of and articulate legal responses to questions of
terminating treatment.
I. THE "RIGHT TO DIE": EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT
Philosophers have addressed questions concerning the mo-
rality of suicide and euthanasia, and the proper relationship
[VOL. 77
1988-891 THE RIGHT TO DIE
between the physician and the patient confronting death, for
centuries. But only in recent decades has Anglo-American law
been a significant part of the debate. The traditional attitude
of the law was consistent: suicide was a crime at common law,9
assisting suicide was uniformly treated as a serious crime, 0 and
any type of "mercy killing" was condemned by homicide sta-
tutes." Although juries might be reluctant to punish defendants
who were acting out of sympathy for their victims, the state of
the law itself was clear.' 2 And there is little reason to believe
that this legal attitude toward death was not generally approved.
During the 1930s, societies to promote the concept of eu-
thanasia were established in both Britain and the United States.13
These organizations sought to legalize "mercy killings" in par-
ticular circumstances. Although bills to that effect were intro-
duced in Britain and some American states, 4 none were enacted.
9 See Tate v. Canonica, 5 Cal.Rptr. 28 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960), quoting Blackstone:
Self-Murder, the pretended heroism, but real cowardice, of the Stoic
philosophers, who destroyed themselves to avoid those ills which they had
not the fortitude to endure ... was punished by the Athenian law with
cutting off the hand .... And also the law of England wisely and
religiously considers that no man hath a power to destroy life ... and,
as the suicide is guilty of a double offense; one spiritual ... the other
temporal, against the king who hath an interest in the preservation of all
his subjects; the law has therefore ranked this among the highest crimes
Id. at 31-32 (quoting 4 BI.ACKSTONE'S COMANTARmES ch. 14, p. 189 (1778)).
10 This was true at common law. See McMahon v. State, 53 So. 89, 90-91 (Ala.
1910). It continues to be so under statutes. See Chanslor v. State, 697 S-W.2d 393
(Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
1 See State v. Ehlers, 119 A. I5, 17 (N.J. 1922). Rex v. Simpson, L.J.K.B.
(1915). The line between active murder and "merely" assisting suicide can be a narrow
one. See People v. Roberts, 178 N.W. 690 (Mich. 1920) (defendant convicted of murder
for mixing poison and placing it within the reach of his suicidal wife).
12 See Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing"
Legislation, 42 MmNN. L. REv. 969, 970-71, 1019-24 (1958).
11 See 0. RUSSELL, FREEDoM TO Di: MoRAL AND LEGAL AsPEcrs OF EUTHANASIA
64-86 (1977). Britain's Voluntary Euthanasia Legalization Society was supported by
such notables as Julian Huxley, H.G. Wells, George Bernard Shaw, and A.A. Milne.
The Euthanasia Society of America, founded by Rev. Charles Francis Potter, included
on its advisory council Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick, Margaret Sanger, and Sherwood
Anderson. Id.
14 Lord Ponsonby introduced the Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalization) Bill in the
House of Lords on November 4, 1936. Id. at 68. As its name implies, it was limited
to voluntary choices made by the dying person, A similar bill was introduced in the
Nebraska state legislature in February 1937. Id. at 68-72.
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World War II put a temporary end to such discussions, not
only by turning legislators' minds to more pressing matters, but
also, and more significantly, by focusing attention on the sys-
tematic extermination of millions seen by the Nazis as unfit to
live. 15
The debate over euthanasia was revived in the 1950s, largely
by the publication of Glanville Williams' book, The Sanctity of
Life and the Criminal Law.16 Williams strongly advocated le-
galization of mercy killing when it was requested by an adult
suffering from an incurable illness that would cause severe pain
or make the patient incapable of leading a rational existence.' 7
The book did not receive universal praise. Professor Yale Kam-
isar was its most prominent academic critic. 8 States did not
alter their laws in response to Williams' arguments.
Before the mid-1970s, reported cases of patients' refusal of
lifesaving medical treatment usually focused on the patient's
religious beliefs. Where such beliefs precluded acceptance of
treatment, the free exercise clause of the first amendment was
often found to override any state interest in preserving life.' 9
Occasionally, however, a court would weigh the facts differ-
, Id. at 87-94. In a widely quoted'article, Dr. Leo Alexander, American medical
consultant at the Nuremberg trials, wrote that Nazi crimes "started with the acceptance
of an attitude, basic to the euthanasia movement, that there is such a thing as life not
worthy to be lived, and then spread to all 'useless eaters' and politically and socially
unwanted persons." Id. at 93. In 1950, the World Medical Association, at the same
meeting in which the German Medical profession was readmitted to that body, approved
a resolution that "condemn[ed] the practice of euthanasia under any circumstances."
Id. at 94.
16 G. WmLi1ms, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRmINAL LAW (1972). The book
expanded on Williams' 1956 James Carpentier lectures at Columbia University and the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
17 Indeed, that may be putting it too mildly. Williams stated that "euthanasia
... is morally permissible and indeed mandatory where it is performed upon a dying
patient with his consent and is the only way of relieving his suffering.... [A] man is
entitled to demand the release of death from hopeless and helpless pain." Id. at 311
(emphasis added). The book also argued for decriminalization of contraception, vol-
untary sterilization, abortion, suicide and, most strikingly, infanticide, which Williams
saw as essentially a psychiatric problem.
18 Kamisar, supra note 12. Of course, the book was also received enthusiastically
by some. See Russell, Book Review, 10 STAN. L. REv. 382 (1958).
11 See, e.g., Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1972);
Montgomery v. Board of Retirement of Kern County, 109 Cal.Rptr. 181 (Ct. App.
1973); In Re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. 1965).
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ently, and the free exercise claim would fail.20 Although the
factors discussed were quite similar to those that would be used
later, when the constitutional claim had shifted from freedom
of religion to a "right to die" as part of the right of privacy,
the cases generally employed the type of analysis used in any
other free exercise inquiry. 21
The emergence of the constitutional right to privacy during
the 1960s and the recognition in Roe v. Wade22 that such a right
could extend to fundamental questions of life or death estab-
lished the foundation of the current debate over the "right to
die." No longer is it necessary, or even particularly helpful, to
focus on questions of religious belief. Constitutional law is now
accustomed to the claim of control of an individual's body
without government interference as a freestanding claim of right.
The widely noted case of In re Quinlan23 brought the issue
of euthanasia to public prominence and set the tone for the
steady acceptance of the concept of the "right to die" since its
decision in 1975. The father of Karen Quinlan petitioned a New
Jersey court for permission to authorize, as her guardian, dis-
continuance of "all extraordinary medical procedures" sustain-
ing her life. Ms. Quinlan was a 22-year-old woman who had
fallen into an irreversible coma?4 All involved in the litigation
20 See, e.g., Application of President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1010
(D.C. Cir. 1964) (ordering emergency transfusion where uncertainty existed over pa-
tient's true desires); United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965) (same).
21 The modern test for determining whether a government practice violates the
first amendment guarantee of free exercise of religion was set forth in Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Initially,
the court must determine whether a government practice substantially burdens the
practice of the challenger's religion. If the answer is yes, the court "must next consider
whether some compelling state interest" justifies that burden. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at
406. On its surface, this is, of course, the difficult-to-satisfy "strict scrutiny" test
applied in several constitutional contexts. Several cases, however, indicate that it is
often, in practice, a more flexible balancing approach than the normal strict scrutiny
inquiry. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987) (upholding prison
regulations that had the effect of preventing Islamic prisoners from attending Friday
midday services); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (holding that the Air
Force need not permit an Orthodox Jew to wear a yarmulke in violation of uniform
dress requirements).
- 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating statutes prohibiting abortion).
- 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
24 "[S]he had a temperature of 100 degrees, her pupils were unreactive and she
1988-89]
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believed that Ms. Quinlan was being kept alive only by the
artificial respirator to which she had been attached since she
unexpectedly, for reasons never discovered, lost consciousness. 2
Ms. Quinlan was not dead, either by common law standards
defining death as the total cessation of "all vital functions, ' 26
or by more modem statutory standards defining death as the
total cessation of brain activity.27 She was, however, in a "chronic
and persistent 'vegetative' state," unresponsive, apparently un-
aware of outside activity, making only "stereotyped cries and
sounds and ... chewing motions. ' 28 Her family, after months
of reflection, decided to seek to withdraw the respirator that
appeared to be sustaining her life. They did not, however, seek
to withdraw artificial feeding tubes also in use.
was unresponsive even to deep pain .... [she was] comatose with evidence of decorti-
cation, a condition relating to the derangement of the cortex of the brain .... She
required a respirator to assist her breathing." Id. at 654.
2 "The experts believe that Karen cannot now survive without the assistance of
the respirator; ... that the strong likelihood is that death would follow soon after its
removal. . . ." Id. at 655. But see the comments of Daniel Coburn, her court-appointed
guardian, shortly after the decision:
[Firom my discussions with the doctors it was indicated that when the
respirator is disconnected, Karen Quinlan is not going to die. No one
knows how long she will survive. She may survive for weeks. When I say
she is not going to die I mean that she is not going to die specifically
because of the removal of the respirator. She will undoubtedly die because
of infection or some other complication.
Symposium Panel, supra note 1, at 519. In fact, she survived not merely for weeks,
but for several years. See Schmeck, A Medical Turning Point: Quinlan Case Symbolized
Ethical Problems Caused by Use of Life-Support Equipment, N.Y. Times, June 13,
1985, at B2, col. 1.
1 Death is traditionally defined for legal purposes as "[tihe cessation of life."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARy 360 (5th ed. 1979).
27 See, e.g., KAr. STAT. ANN. § 77-205 (1984 & Supp. 1987); MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. §§ 5-201-203 (1982 & Supp. 1987). See also Capron & Kass, A Statutory
Definition of the Standards for Determining Human Death, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 87
(1972-73).
2 Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 655. Daniel Coburn described the situation even more
strikingly:
We went to St. Clare's Hospital and really expected that we would walk
in and just see a girl in a regular hospital bed ... maybe a tube in her
nose or intravenous tubes-nothing more than that. But we saw a ghastly
sight. It was absolutely incredible .... We just couldn't believe that there
was this thing lying in bed. I looked at her, and it seemed like forever....
I looked at her and turned around and said, "Don, can you believe this?"
Symposium Panel, supra note 1, at 509.
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey held in favor of Joseph
Quinlan. Although it might have based its decision on free
exercise grounds, in light of Mr. Quinlan's reliance on Catholic
teachings to support his decision to remove the respirator, the
court specifically declined to do so. It relied instead on the right
to privacy. Of crucial significance to the development of the
law on this issue was the court's holding that what was at stake
was not Joseph Quinlan's right of privacy, but Karen's. Of
course, Ms. Quinlan could not make her own decision. There-
fore, the court held that "It]he only practical way to prevent
destruction of the right is to permit the guardian and family
... to render their best judgment.., as to whether she would
exercise it . "...-29 The court would provide some checks on
the decision making power of the family or guardian, but with-
out mandatory recourse to the court system in all cases. The
concurrence of the attending physician and the hospital "ethics
committee" that "there is no reasonable possibility of [the
patient] bver emerging from her present comatose condition to
a cognitive, sapient state"30 was essential. And the court went
on to state, in a counterfactual statement that has received some
criticism, 31 that it had "no doubt ... that if Karen were herself
miraculously lucid for an interval . . . and perceptive of her
irreversible condition, she could effectively decide upon discon-
tinuance of the life-support apparatus .... -32 In short, the
guardian's decision to terminate treatment must be reasonable
to informed medical observers. At least, the decision must not
be clearly inconsistent with what we "know" the patient would
choose.
The court's approach in Quinlan has, in its broad outlines,
set the tone for the analysis of similar cases by most courts in
recent years. The starting point has been that withdrawal of
Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664.
Io d. at 671.
" See, e.g., Note, The Tragic Choice: Termination of Care for Patients in a
Permanent Vegetative State, 51 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 285, 294-95.
32 Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663. The court seems to base this on its perceptions of
what most people would do, rather than on particular characteristics of Karen Quinlan.
Id. at 664. But is this really, then, her decision, or is it society's? A lucid Karen is,
quite simply, someone who is not Karen at all. See Gelfand, Euthanasia and the
Terminally Ill Patient, 63 NEB. L. Rav. 741, 774-75 (1984).
1988-89]
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medical treatment is a question that will be left to the decision
of the patient. While the patient's discretion will not be unlim-
ited, the scope of any restrictions that exist remains unclear.
And, in an analytical leap of great significance, where the
patient is in no condition to make a decision, some system will
be created, not to make a decision for or about the patient, but
to attempt to approximate the patient's own decision. Thus, the
decision is seen as one involving the exercise of the patient's
individual right. It is most emphatically not characterized as a
decision by others (and most certainly not by the state or the
community at large) that the patient's life should be terminated.
Courts and legislatures strive to maintain this basic orientation
in addressing cases involving several different types of problems
concerning those near death.
Lawyers and philosophers have used several distinctions to
categorize different types of euthanasia. The two most widely
used are the distinction between "voluntary" and "involuntary"
euthanasia and the distinction between "active" and "passive"
methods of euthanizing patients.33 While each of these distinc-
tions can be criticized as being imprecise3 4 they continue to be
influential and helpful to courts and commentators. Voluntary
euthanasia is, of course, chosen by the patient, while involun-
tary euthanasia is performed pursuant to the wishes of an-
other.35 Active methods of euthanasia include those things done
to hasten the natural process of death. Passive methods go no
further than refusal to engage in life-prolonging medical activ-
ity.36 As might be expected, voluntary euthanasia is generally
11 See, e.g., G. GRiSEZ & J. BoYLE, supra note 1, at 86-97 and 139-42; Vodiga,
Euthanasia and the Right to Die - Moral, Ethical and Legal Perspectives, 51 Cm.
[-]KEMT L. REv. 1, 2-5 (1974).
14 See Kamisar, supra note 12, at 1014-30 (on the voluntary-involuntary distinc-
tion) and Gelfand, supra note 32, at 753-56 (on the active-passive distinction).
31 "[A]ctive euthanasia is voluntary only if Patient is legally competent and gives
informed consent to being killed by Agent." G. GRisEz & J. BovLa, supra note 1, at
139.
36 [E]uthanasia is mercy killing; it involves an activity: someone's doing
something in order to bring about death. In recent discussion "euthana-
sia" in this sense is often called "active euthanasia."...
Distinguished from active euthanasia in much recent discussion is the
withholding or termination of medical treatment ... required to preserve
or prolong life in someone suffering from a painful or prolonged mortal
[VOL. 77
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seen as far more acceptable than involuntary euthanasia, and
passive methods are more readily accepted than active measures.
In recent cases involving choices by competent adults choos-
ing passive means of euthanasia, courts have generally had little
difficulty deferring to the patient's wishes. In Lane v. Can-
dura,37 for example, a Massachusetts court found the patient to
be competent and held that her decision not to submit to am-
putation of a limb would be respected, even if that decision was
not the medically "rational" thing to do.38 A New York court,
upholding a competent patient's wish to be removed from di-
alysis, stated: "It is well settled in this state that 'every human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right, at common
law, to determine what shall be done with his own body and
cannot be subjected to medical treatment without his con-
sent. ' '' 39 Like all rights, this is not said to be absolute but is
subject to being overridden by a compelling state interest. 40 It
has been rare, however, for courts to find the generalized state
interest in preserving life sufficient to override the patient's
choice. Occasionally a court has invoked the patient's duties
toward dependent children to override a choice to refuse treat-
ment, 41 but aside from these exceptions, courts have responded
illness or injury .... Such withholding or termination of lifesaving med-
ical treatment has been called "passive euthanasia."
Id. at 86.
37 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).
31 "[T]he irrationality of her decision does not justify a conclusion that Mrs.
Candura is incompetent in the legal sense." Id. at 1235-36. The court rejected the
argument that the irrationality of the decision along with "some indications of a degree
of senility and confusion" were sufficient to prove incompetence. Id. at 1234.
'1 In re Application of Lydia E. Hall Hosp., 455 N.Y.S.2d 706, 711 (Sup. Ct.
1982) (quoting Schloendorff v. New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (1914)). By the time of
the decision, October 22, 1982, the patient had fallen into a coma. However, since he
had stated his desire to end treatment only a few days before he lost consciousness on
October 17, the court treated this as a case involving the choice of a competent patient.
Id.
40 "Such interests include the prevention of suicide and/or protection of minor
children or other dependents." Id.
41 See, e.g., George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (patient was the father of a minor child
and the court had doubts about the firmness of his resolve). The importance of the
presence of children most often is noted not as ratio descidendi, but as dicta. See, e.g.,
Holmes, 340 F. Supp. at 130. The most compelling type of case involving the welfare
of a child is that involving a pregnant patient, whose refusal of treatment would imperil
the unbornchild. See Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 201
A.2d 537 (N.J. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
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favorably to the voluntary choices of competent patients to
accept death as the consequence of rejecting medical treatment.
The legal and ethical distinction between voluntary and in-
voluntary euthanasia has remained firm. Courts and legislatures
still refuse to authorize withdrawal of treatment against the
express wishes of the patient, and there is little reason to antic-
ipate that this will change in the foreseeable future. 42 The pro-
hibition on involuntary euthanasia makes no distinction between
active and passive methods. The distinction between active and
passive methods continues to be relevant to the analysis of
voluntary euthanasia. While some have criticized the distinction
as artificial, 43 and some have advised against a blanket prohi-
bition against active euthanasia, 44 the law remains wary of active
41 The recent furor over the publication by the Journal of the American Medical
Association of an essay describing a mercy killing by a physician under circumstances
at least calling into question whether it was voluntary is clear evidence that the public
strongly opposes involuntary euthanasia. Johnson, A Piece of the AMA's Mind, Chi-
cago Tribune Mar. 9, 1988, at 19 col. 1.
41 The active-passive distinction seems clear only against a background that has
already decided, to a large extent, what duties run from one person to another. Is
there a duty to provide medical care? If so, the failure to do so is an act for purposes
of the criminal law. A parent who fails to call a doctor for a sick child may be guilty
of homicide, where a stranger engaging in the same conduct has done no criminal act.
See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, CmmR&I LAW 184 (1972). Other legal systems, by defining
the scope of duty more broadly, have altered the concept of what it means to act so
that it becomes less a matter of observable movement and more of choosing one course
of conduct over another. See Larguier, French Penal Law and the Duty to Aid Persons
in Danger, 38 TuL. L. REv. 81 (1963-64). But the active-passive distinction has its
defenders, see, e.g., Louisell, Euthanasia and Biathanasia: On Dying and Killing, 22
CAra. U.L. Rav. 723, 739 (1973).
- "[T]he rightness or wrongness of euthanasia ... whether direct or indirect,
depends on the situation. Neither form is intrinsically or invariably good or evil.
Sometimes mercy killing is right; sometimes 'letting the patient go' is wrong. It de-
pends." Fletcher, The "Right" to Live and the "Right" to Die in BENEFICENT EUtaA-
NAsiA 44, 50 (M. Kohl ed. 1975). Marvin Kohl goes even further than to grant mere
permission to active euthanasia in cases involving
the inducement of a relatively painless and quick death, the intention and
actual consequences of which are the kindest possible treatment of an
unfortunate individual in the actual circumstances .... My claim is that
in situations where there are no overriding rights or similar considerations
voluntary active beneficient euthanasia . .. is a moral obligation.
Kohl, Voluntary Beneficent Euthanasia in BENEFICENT EUTHANASIA, supra at 130, 134-
35. By no means do all commentators agree. See Sullivan, The Immorality of Euthanasia
in BENEFICENT EuTrrNAsA, supra, at 12 nn.9-18 and accompanying text. .
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methods, even in voluntary cases. The state, it is recognized,
still may prohibit facilitation of suicide. 45
Thus, voluntary passive euthanasia is the type that has most
readily gained legal acceptance, and it is clear that the voluntary
nature of the decision is of greater importance than the passive
nature of the methods. The law still sharply rejects involuntary
euthanasia, yet the seminal case in the acceptance of voluntary
withdrawal of treatment, Quinlan, did not involve a decision
by the patient herself. It is this leap from the decision of a
competent patient near death to the decision of some surrogate
that has led to the most extensive discussion of the "right to
die." Under what circumstances may withdrawal of life-sustain-
ing treatment pursuant to the decision of someone other than
the patient validly be classified as voluntary euthanasia?
When permitting the withdrawal of care, courts have gen-
erally characterized the decision by the surrogate as the best
possible approximation of the patient's wishes. The leading
example, already discussed, is Quinlan. The hopelessness of the
situation, the relationship of the patient to the surrogate deci-
sion maker, and the absence of any indication that the patient
would clearly prefer continued artificial respiration combined
to create circumstances in which the court felt justified in find-
ing her father's decision to be the patient's own.46
Some courts have made genuine assessments of the patient's
own feelings on extraordinary medical treatment and have
reached different results depending on the outcome of this
inquiry. In In re Storar,47 for example, the New York Court of
Appeals decided consolidated cases involving applications by
guardians for permission to terminate medical treatment. In the
first case, the patient was an 83-year-old member of a religious
order who had fallen into a coma following a hernia operation.
He was being kept alive by means of an artificial respirator. 48
Evidence was produced demonstrating that over a period of
41 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text,
46 The interplay of the "several variables" present in a case such as Quinlan is
discussed by Cantor in Quinlan, Privacy, and the Handling of Incompetent Dying
Patients, 30 RUTGERs L. REv. 243, 256-61 (1977).
-' 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
" Id. at 67.
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years and as recently as "a couple of months before his final
hospitalization," he had stated during formal discussion of
biomedical ethical issues that he would not wish his life pro-
longed by such means. 49 Largely on the basis of this evidence,
the court authorized discontinuance of treatment."0
In the companion case, however, the court refused to au-
thorize termination of treatment. The mother of a 52-year-old
profoundly retarded patient sought to discontinue a series of
blood transfusions necessary to prolong her son's life. The
patient had been diagnosed as having terminal cancer. In this
case, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that to speculate
about the patient's own choice "if he were competent" would
be a completely artificial exercise. 51 In denying the request to
terminate treatment, the court noted that the treatment "did
not involve excessive pain,' '52 but it is unclear whether the
decision is the result of some sort of balancing test, or of a rule
requiring treatment in the absence of convincing evidence of an
incompetent adult's prior wishes, expressed while competent.53
Not all courts have frankly acknowledged their own role in
choosing for those who cannot make their own choice. In the
41 Id. at 68. "IT]he Pope had stated that Catholic principles permitted the
termination of extraordinary life support systems when there is no reasonable hope for
the patient's recovery and. . . that use of [a] respirator. . . constituted an extraordinary
measure under the circumstances." Id.
11 Id. at 72-74.
11 "As one of the experts testified at the hearing, that would be similar to asking
whether 'if it snowed all summer would it then be winter?' Mentally John Storar was
an infant and that is the only realistic way to assess his rights ...." Id. at 72-73.
52 The court expressly reserved the question of whether the presence or absence
of excessive pain would be determinative. Id. at 73. See Kohl's formulation of the
"kindest possible treatment," supra note 44. The question of pain, either from the
treatment or from the patient's condition, also profoundly affects assessment of a
decision by a competent patient. See Twycross, Voluntary Euthanasia, in Suscwa AND
EUTHANASIA, supra note 6, at 88-98.
53 After discussing Storar's condition and the positive and negative effects of
treatment the court concluded
that the application for permission to continue the transfusions should
have been granted. Although we understand and respect his mother's
despair, ... a court should not in the circumstances of this case allow
an incompetent patient to bleed to death because someone, even someone
as close as a parent or sibling, feels that this is best for one with an
incurable disease.
Storar, 420 N.E.2d at 73.
[VOL. 77
THE RIGHT TO DiE
widely discussed case of Superintendent v. Saikewicz,5 4 the
guardian ad litem of a mentally retarded 67-year-old petitioned
for permission to discontinue chemotherapy for the patient's
leukemia. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held
that "a general right in all persons to refuse medical treatment
in appropriate circumstances '"55 exists, and "that right must
extend to the case of an incompetent, as well as a competent,
patient because the value of human dignity extends to both." 56
Although the court recognized the difficulty of ascertaining
the wishes of an incompetent,5 7 it nevertheless held that
the decision in cases such as this should be that which would
be made by the incompetent person, if that person were com-
petent, but taking into account the present and future incom-
petency of the individual as one of the factors which would
necessarily enter into the decision-making process of the com-
petent person.5 1
The language of the Massachusetts court, and its view of what
it was doing, differ sharply from that of the New York court5 9
Yet the two approaches may, in substance, be largely the same.
Both call for the court, a competent decision maker, to act
upon an assessment of the choice an incompetent would make,
were he competent. The Massachusetts court sees this as car-
rying out the wishes of the incompetent. The New York court
recognizes that a hypothetically competent incompetent is a
different person than the actual incompetent! 0 Thus, a decision
concerning treatment will inevitably be that, not of the incom-
petent, but of another, albeit another acting in light of the
incompetent's best interests.
Courts that have faced these questions have often avoided
the Storar court's conclusion that, at least in some cases, it is
" 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
s, Id. at 427.
56 Id.
57 Id.
s1 Id. at 431. The court strains, with limited success, to explain the difference
between this "subjective" standard and an "objective" standard governed by the views
of the majority of the community or the choices of the "reasonable person." Id. at
430-31.
11 See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
60 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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simply impossible to speak of the patient's own choice. Rather,
they have followed the basic orientation of Quinlan and Sai-
kewicz, that is, that the key to resolving questions involving the
termination of life-sustaining medical treatment is to ascertain
the wishes of the patient, even if the patient is unable to express
them.61 While courts note that the patient's choice may some-
times be outweighed by the interests of specific third parties, 62
or the generalized interest of the state in preserving life,63 these
instances seem to be rare exceptions, at least in recent reported
cases. 64 The decision of the autonomous individual has become,
if not decisive, by far the most important factor to be consid-
ered.65 Attention has largely turned to other issues, such as
whether the same analysis should be extended to discontinuance
of artificial feeding techniques, 66 or whether the patient should
be allowed to enlist medical personnel in clearly active methods
of euthanasia, such as the injection of lethal drugs. 67 In short,
61 E.g., In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1984) (recognizing parent's duty to
substitute judgment of infant); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984) (court's
determination of conservatee's best interest includes consideration of conservator's
actual wishes); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) (recognizing guar-
dian's duty to determine the wishes of formerly competent patient). Several other courts
have continued to speak of substituted judgment but have explicitly realized that in the
case of someone who was never competent, that must become somewhat of an objective,
"reasonable person" test. E.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Ct. App.
1983) (where patient's choice is unascertainable, decision should be based upon objective
assessment of best interests); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 482 A.2d 713, 721
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1984) (necessity of "reference to objective societally shared criteria").
62 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
63 This interest alone, while recognized as legitimate, rarely outweighs the patient's
privacy interests. See In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980); In re Conroy, 486
A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
64 See, e.g., Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hospital, 482 A.2d 713 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1984) (right to die held to override state interest in preserving life); In re Guardi-
anship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. App. 1984) (same).
61 See generally Note, The Conflict Continues: Who Decides Treatment Questions
For the Terminally-Ill Incompetent Patient, 18 SmUioLK U.L. Rnv. 641 (1984).
6See, e.g., Connery, The Ethical Standards for Withholding/Withdrawing Nu-
trition and Hydration, 2 Issurs L. & MED. 87 (1986); Ethical Symposium, 2 IssuEs L.
& MED. 99 (1986); see also Gray v. Romeo, 87-05873B (D.R.I. Oct. 17, 1988) (patients
have the right to refuse medical treatment, including feeding tubes, when they fall into
persistent, vegetative states).
67 See supra notes 43-44; see also O'Brien, Facilitating Euthanatic, Rational
Suicide: Help Me Go Gentle into That Good Night, 31 ST. Louis U.L.J. 655 (1986-
87); Note, Voluntary Active Euthanasia for the Terminally Ill and the Constitutional
Right to Privacy, 69 CORNELL L. Rv. 363 (1983-84).
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it seems to have become generally accepted that the discontin-
uance of "extraordinary" medical treatment is, and should be,
a personal decision, the exercise of a "right to die."
If the patient's choice is considered crucial, the fact that the
patient will often be incompetent at the point at which the
decision to continue or to terminate treatment must be made is,
of course, troublesome. In an attempt to deal with this problem,
and also, presumably, to reduce the need for extensive judicial
intervention, a number of states have, by legislation, authorized
"living wills." A "living will" is a written declaration indicating
the declarant's wishes concerning future medical treatment, spe-
cifically stating when such treatment should be withheld. Since
the initial effort of California in 1976,68 more than thirty states
have chosen this route in an attempt to bring more certainty to
this area of the law.69
The statutes are largely alike in their fundamental outline.
They establish some procedure by which a person may execute
a directive that treatment be withheld when that person is ter-
minally ill.7o Health professionals who act in accord with a
properly executed directive of this sort are held immune from
any civil or criminal liability for doing so. 71 Still, there are
important differences among the statutes. To some extent, they
differ in their definition of a "terminal illness" that gives effect
to a directive. 72 Some, but not all, suspend the effect of the
" Natural Death Act, ch. 1439, 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. 6478 (West) (codified at
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1988).
" Note, To Die or Not To Die: The New York Legislature Ponders a Natural
Death Act, 13 Fo~RtAM URa. L.J. 639, 654 n.114 (1985).
10 Id. at 654-55.
71 Id. at 655.
72 The most commonly used definition of terminal illness, with minor modifica-
tions, is found in the California statute: "an incurable condition caused by injury,
disease or illness, which, regardless of the application of life-sustaining procedures,
would, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death, and where the application
of life-sustaining procedures serve only to postpone the moment of death . . . ." CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187(0 (West Supp. 1988); see, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. §
97.050(6) (1988); Tax. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h § 2(7) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
Other states use different formulations. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-2(F) (1978).
Still others do not define the term at all. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(b)(1)
(1985).
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directive during a patient's pregnancy. 73 The formalities required
for the execution of the document vary widely.74
The most significant differences among the statutes are
found, however, with respect to three questions: (1) who may
make a decision to terminate treatment; (2) when that decision
may be made; and (3) which medical procedures, if any, cannot
be terminated despite the existence of a directive to stop treat-
ment. Some statutes permit a decision to be made only by the
patient, 75 others permit some type of proxy decisions. The latter
can be further divided into two types of substitute decision-
making: a decision to terminate treatment made by a person
appointed in advance by the patient to make such decisions 7 6
or a decision made by a proxy appointed by statute, usually a
close relative, whether or not an advance declaration to that
effect has been made by the patient. 77 With regard to the "when"
question, some states permit an effective declaration to be made
only after a diagnosis of terminal illness,78 others have no such
requirement.7 9 Some,80 but not all, 81 statutes provide a limited
73 Compare TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h § 3(d) (Vernon Supp. 1988)
(directive shall have no force or effect during pregnancy) with VA. CODE ANN. § 54-
325.8:4 (Supp. 1987) (no such provision).
7 See generally Note, supra note 69, at 654-63. See also SocIMa FOR THE RIGHT
To Di, HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAWS 1981-84 (1984) [hereinafter HANDBOOK],
especially the "Checklist Chart" at 31-34.
71 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 44 7185-7195; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-
32-1 - 12 (1985 & Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28, 101 - 109 (1985).
76 E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:4 (declaration may include "designation of
another person to make the treatment decision for the declarant should he be" unable
to do so); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.05 (West 1986) (same).
" See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 ("Procedures for natural death in the
absence of a declaration"); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:6 ("Procedures in absence of
declaration").
7" See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (although directive may be
executed by any adult, it is binding only if the adult was a "qualified patient," i.e.
under a diagnosis of terminal illness. Otherwise, the directive "may" be given weight
in the physician's decision); TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h, § 4 (same); see
also IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4504 (Supp. 1988) (directive must include statement that patient
has been diagnosed with terminal illness; apparently ineffective otherwise).
79 Apparently, only the three statutes cited in supra note 78 limit the declaration
to already diagnosed terminal patients. See Note, supra note 69, at 659-60.
90 CAL. HEALTH & SAFrTY CODE § 7189.5 (five years).
8' The large majority of states with living will statutes do not provide for auto-
matic expiration but rather provide that declarations remain effective until revoked.
See HANDBOOK, supra note 74, at 32-33.
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period of time in which the declaration will be effective. Finally,
some states exclude procedures that provide nourishment or
relieve pain from the scope of treatment that may be terminated
pursuant to such a declaration. 82
Generally, then, statutory approaches have not diverged
sharply from the approaches of courts that have addressed these
questions without clear legislative guidance. The basic goal of
courts and legislatures in this field is to recognize and protect
the "right to die," that is, the power of the autonomous indi-
vidual to resolve the question of whether to attempt to preserve
that individual's life. While courts and legislators differ on the
ways in which that end is best achieved, they seem to concur in
their endorsement of the end itself. Commentators have also
generally endorsed this basic orientation, and most seem to
endorse the less restrictive approaches to defining the scope of
that autonomous choice. Criticism has been aimed, for example,
at the distinction between "extraordinary" medical procedures,
which may be terminated, and such "ordinary" procedures as
nutrition, which may not.8 3 Some have criticized the requirement
that an effective declaration of desire to terminate treatment be
executed very near the time of its use. 84 Still others criticize the
denial of the extension of proxy decisionmaking authority in
the case of incompentent patients. 5 Despite what appears to be
an emerging favorable consensus, some serious questions must
be raised not only about the details of "living will" legislation,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.03(3); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-2(5) (Supp. 1988); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2 § 702(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
154.01(5) (West Supp. 1988); Wyo. STAT. § 35-22-101(a)(iii) (1988). See supra note 66
and accompanying text.
"1 See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1233: "[T]he primary focus should be the patient's
desires and experience of pain and enjoyment-not the type of treatment involved."
See also supra note 66 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Martyn & Jacobs, Legislating Advance Directives for the Terminally
Ill: The Living Will and Durable Power of Attorney, 63 NEB. L. REv. 779, 790 (1984)
("such provisions are unrealistic and unworkable"); Note, supra note 69, at 675
(recommending against such restrictions).
11 See, e.g., Comment, Withholding Life-Sustaining Treatment from the Incom-
petent Patient: The Need for Statutory Guidelines, 17 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 427, 444
(1985-86) ("To preserve the traditional doctor-patient-family relationship, legislatures
should establish the right of families or guardians of incompetent patients, in conjunc-
tion with the attending physician, to make decisions concerning the withdrawal or
initiation of the patient's medical treatment.").
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but also about some of the fundamental assumptions that un-
derlie the concept of the "right to die."
II. THE "RIGHT TO DIE": CRITICISM OF A FLAWED CONCEPT
Published responses to the recognition and development of
the "right to die" have been generally favorable. Negative
reaction to statutes and court opinions on the subject often take
the position that particular definitions of the scope of the right
are too timid and do not go far enough in eliminating legal
obstacles to the withdrawal of medical treatment in hopeless
cases."' But there seems to be little dissent from several funda-
mental propositions that underlie the "right to die." First, there
is a right to have medical treatment withheld in cases of terminal
illness. Second, this right can be best secured through legal
recognition of the power of proxy decisions to this effect, both
through the use of legally binding "living wills" and through
grants of power to relatives to act on behalf of incompetent
patients. Finally, the guiding principle in the development of
law on this subject is that these decisions properly should be
removed from society as a whole, and vested in the autonomous
individual. 87
That the withdrawal of treatment, once labelled as a right,
should be analyzed as a situation in which the interests of the
autonomous individual are set against those of the state (or, to
use a less harsh word, those of society) is hardly surprising. It
86 See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
,7 Surely the most florid expression of this sentiment is that of Luis Kuttner:
The Living Will is one of the most pervasive and dominant ideologies of
the brands of liberalism in the last half of the 20th Century .... It is
the principle of the sole end for which mankind is privileged the role of
self-determination: non-interference with the liberty of action. Liberty and
individuality have become the dominant and unassailable values of con-
temporary liberalism. The insatiable demand for individual liberty of
decision knows scarcely any bounds, certainly not those of tradition,
moderation, prudence, common sense, decency, civility, or any higher
law. The Living Will breaks with the tradition of the western world with
its complete denigration of authority, which, perforce, must be viewed
illegitimate.
Kuttner, The Living Will: Coping With the Historical Event of Death, 27 BAYLOR L.
REv. 39, 41 (1975). Kuttner was an early advocate of the right to die and the legitimacy
of the advance directive to withdraw treatment.
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is quite consistent with the way law has come to regard disputes
over a broad range of life choices, including the "life or death"
issues present at the start of the life cycle, i.e., the decision to
use birth control or the decision to have an abortion. 8 If all
other questions involving control of one's body are seen as
questions setting individual choice against societal control, then
the decision to die should be seen the same way. Commentators
explaining the basis of the "right to die" generally trace its
roots through the expansion of the general right of privacy. 89
If the decision to die is substantially similar to other deci-
sions seen as properly within the zone of privacy, then similar
standards should apply. But the law has not taken a position
of entirely uncritical acceptance of an individual's stated pre-
ferences, even in matters ultimately viewed as private. In as-
sessing a patient's decision to accept, rather than reject, proferred
medical treatment, for example, courts have insisted that an
autonomous decision worthy of respect by the courts must be
that of an informed individual. 0 Likewise, it would seem that
the decision to refuse treatment should be subject to the same
test of informed consent. But application of the traditional tests
of informed consent to the circumstances surrounding the ex-
ercise of the "right to die" raises serious problems. These
problems have not gone unnoticed, in fact several were discussed
at least as early as 1958 by Professor Yale Kamisar in his widely
noted attack on legalized euthanasia. 91
Informed consent assumes at least two things: that the con-
sent is uncoerced and that it is made with a sufficient amount
of accurate information about consequences. 92 To the extent
I, See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (use of contraceptives);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion). The connection between these cases and
the "right to die" cases has been frequently noted, and the abortion and birth control
analyses are often used by commentators in thinking through the extent of the "right
to die." See, e.g., Note, Rejection of Extraordinary Medical Care by a Terminal
Patient: A Proposed Living Will Statute, 64 IowA L. REv. 573, 596-600 (1978-79).
19 See, e.g., Cantor, supra note 46, at 244-51; Note, supra note 88, at 596-611.
90 See, e.g., Leflar, Liberty and Death: Advance Health Care Directives and the
Law of Arkansas, 39 ARK. L. REv. 375, 391-400 (1976-77); Note, supra note 88, at
587-91.
91 Kamisar, supra note 12, at 985-93.
9 For a collection of modem cases setting forth the scope of this doctrine in
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that a choice to die is made under conditions of severe physical
pain, can it properly be said to be voluntary?93 And to the
extent that medical prognosis is an inexact science and is further
hampered by the inability to foresee future advances in the
ability to cure, is the choice to die based upon sufficient infor-
mation?94
These objections have a surface appeal, but strong responses
to them may be made. The coercion that invalidates individual
consent in most areas of the law is typically brought to bear by
the state, or other individuals, to gain some sort of advantage. 95
Incurable, severe pain is not this type of coercion. Rather, it is
simply a part of the overall situation in which an individual
exists. 9 In an abstract sense this makes a choice to die invol-
untary, but not in the sense that will make a choice legally
invalid. Tragic choices are not necessarily unworthy of respect.
Similarly, the imperfection of available information is quite
similar to the situation that exists throughout the law. As long
as a patient is not deprived of the best available information,
he is in no different position than anyone else who must make
a significant decision based upon imperfect knowledge of the
future. Once again, the law typically will act to invalidate in-
dividual choices when they are made under conditions that
traditional tort litigation, see Annotation, Modern Status of Views as to General
Measure of Physician's Duty to Inform Patient of Risks of Proposed Treatment, 88
A.L.R. 3D 1008 (1978).
91 Kamisar, supra note 12, at 985-93. Kamisar quotes Dr. I.P. Frohman, who
stated that much proposed "mercy killing" legislation proposes that the patient's
request to die be valid "only if the victim is both sane and crazed with pain." Id. at
986 (quoting Frohman, Vexing Problems in Forensic Medicine: A Physician's View-
point, 31 N.Y.U. L. RPv. 1215, 1222 (1956)).
9, Kamisar, supra note 12, at 993-1013.
91 For example, a criminal defendant may argue that he acted only pursuant to
a threat of serious bodily injury made by another. See United States v. Johnson, 381
F. Supp. 210, 211-12 (D. Minn. 1974), aff'd, 516 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 859 (1975). Personal economic necessity, however, such as hunger, will not
excuse theft of food. State v. Moe, 24 P.2d 638 (Wash. 1933). See People v. Whipple,
279 P. 1008 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1929).
96 This is assuming, of course, that the pain actually cannot be eased. Robert
Twycross cautions that in discussing euthanasia, "much of the supporting 'evidence'
derives from instances in which pain or other symptoms have been inadequately con-
trolled and from the use of inappropriate treatments," Twycross, Voluntary Euthanasia,
in SUICIDE AND EuTANAsiA, supra note 6, at 97. He calls for increased attention by
the medical profession to the art of pain relief. Id. at 98.
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someone could, and should, have improved. But the fact that
choices are made under imperfect conditions does not make
them invalid. 97
There is, however, a more serious problem with the char-
acterization of many of the decisions given controlling effect
under living will statutes or "right to die" caselaw as products
of informed consent. Much commentary has praised the advance
declarations of the living will as the most effective way to assure
informed consent. Under such an arrangement, it is said, the
individual will make his or her decision about future medical
treatment under conditions that best assure a rational choice. 98
The absence of pain and the ability to reflect are optimal
conditions for planning one's life. But these assumptions are
troubling. As Professor Kamisar noted thirty years ago:
Is this much different from holding a man to a prior statement
of intent that if such and such an employment opportunity
would present itself he would accept it, or if such and such a
young woman were to come along he would marry her? Need
one marshal authority for the proposition that many an "iffy"
inclination is disregarded when the actual facts are at hand? 99
The more important a decision is to one's life, the less
reliable abstract speculation about how that decision would be
made in the indefinite future becomes. Despite neoclassical mi-
croeconomic theory,' °° important life decisions will not turn
entirely on the calculus of rational considerations. These deci-
sions will also include assessment of emotions, desires, fears,
and other feelings that cannot possibly be made, except in the
actual presence of those sentiments. To be "informed" in such
circumstances means not merely to have access to data, or
" Thus, mistake will justify recission of a contract only in limited circumstances;
mere imperfect information about present or future conditions of fact will not be
sufficient to do so in itself. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILO, CONTRACTS 378-85 (3rd ed.
1987).
" See, e.g., Kuttner, supra note 87, at 39 ("[A] thinking individual owes [it] to
himself to rationally approach death without terror or anxiety anticipating the event
when his life processes may be, and are, irreversibly disabled."); Cantor, supra note
46, at 261-62.
" Kamisar, supra note 12, at 989.
10 This theory has been most cogently explained and applied to legal topics by
Judge Richard Posner. R. POSNEaR, THE EcONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
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command of philosophy or other theories of life, but to be
aware of one's own reaction to the situation in the concrete-
information that cannot be obtained apart from actual confron-
tation with the situation.
This may be most clearly so with respect to the question of
the reaction to one's own mortality. It may be true that the
awareness of one's own mortality, more than any other single
factor, makes us human. The Book of Genesis sets forth the
fundamental story of how men and women fell from the undis-
turbed joy of Eden to the anxious and often tragic state that is
the human condition. The moment of the fall from grace, the
moment at which Adam and Eve became recognizable as fully
human, is described as the moment at which they acquired
knowledge of good and evil. 01 Evil connotes imperfection; im-
perfection connotes limits; the ultimate limit for the individual
is death. Adam and Eve became conscious of their nakedness,
that is, their vulnerability. And the crucial point in defining
their humanity is not when they became vulnerable, but when
they became conscious of it. It is this awareness of vulnerability,
and ultimately of mortality, not merely the objective existence
of the condition, which defines the tragic aspects of humanity.
Much, if not most, of human activity can be seen as reaction
to the awareness of mortality. This will range from the most
simple and concrete steps necessary to keep the self physically
healthy to the most abstract activity of creating philosophies to
explain the transcendent meaning of what can seem to be a
futile existence. 02 This reaction to niortality, the drive for self-
101 "But, of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it;
for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." Genesis 2:17.
,02 See Slote, Existentialism and the Fear of Dying, in BIOMEDIcAL ETMIcs AND
Tm LAW (J. Humber and R. Almeder 2d ed. 1979). Slote discusses Kierkegaard's
criticism of the tendency of people to live, in the "world-historical," that is, to find
meaning not in subjective experience, but only in one's minor participation in the
outside world.
[W]e may be able to explain the tendency to live for the world-historical
as resulting from our characteristically human fear of dying .... Con-
sider the claim that people who live for the world-historical sometimes
make that they will be or become immortal through their works, or that
they will live on through their works ....
Id. at 591-92 (emphasis in original). The artificiality of this claim can, of course, be
seen by one with insight, even one engaged in creating works that will survive him.
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preservation in all of its forms, can lead to positive, even heroic,
activity in creating and preserving the beautiful and valuable
aspects of existence. It can also, however, take neurotic and
profoundly destructive forms.103
One of the basic insights of various nineteenth and twentieth
century philosophies and psychologies that might loosely be
grouped together under the label of existentialism'04 is the im-
portance of the ways in which people construct elaborate de-
fenses to enable them to avoid feeling the full force of the
presence of mortality. 0 5 While we all agree, if asked, that our
eventual death is inevitable, careful observers of the human
condition note that, to most of us most of the time, this abstract
proposition is so distant from full consciousness as to hardly
qualify as a belief at all. Freud noted that most people do not
actually believe in their own individual mortality. °6
And this is hardly surprising. To believe in something re-
quires at a minimum the ability to conceive of it. To conceive
of death, at least in the absence of an afterlife that resembles
earthly existence, requires the ability to imagine one's own non-
existence, at least in any form recognizable as worldly existence.
And any attempt to imagine one's own non-existence calls forth
the problem of Descarte's cogito ergo sum. 0 7 The best you can
do is imagine a world without you, but still, there you are,
Woody Allen, when asked in a television interview whether he hoped to live forever in
his movies, once responded "no, I hope to live forever in my apartment."
103 For an extensive discussion of the negative results, personal and social, of the
"realization of mortality, see E. BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH (1973).
11, For brief introductions to the major themes and philosophers of this "school,"
see R. OLSoN, supra note 4; W. BARRET, IRRATIONAL. MAN: A STrDY IN EXISTENTIAL
PHILOSOPHY (1958). See also, Slote, supra note 102.
"0 See E. BECKER, supra note 103.
1o6 Freud, "Thoughts for the Times on War and Death," in 4 S. FtUD, COL-
LECTED PAPERS (1975). Thus, the most prominent expert on the psychological aspects
of the process of dying, Dr. Elisabeth Kubler-Ross, has noted that the typical initial
reaction to a diagnosis of terminal illness is fierce denial. See E. KUrLER-Ross, ON
DEATH AND DYING 34 (1969). The most extensive social history of attitudes toward
death is probably P. ARms, supra note 5.
101 Descartes, Discourses on the Method, in PmILOSOPHCAL WORKS OF DESCARTES
(E. Haldane and G. Ross eds. 1955). This short piece, indeed this single insight, is
generally considered to be the starting point of "modem" philosophy, for good or ill.
See generally J. STotrr, TE FrIGHT FROM AUTHORITY: RELIGION, MORALITY AND THE
QUESr FOR AUTONOMY (1981).
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somewhere above and outside the world, as if in a spaceship,
doing the imagining. The whole problem is so profoundly dis-
turbing that in order to go through life without being paralyzed
by fear and anxiety, we generally succeed in avoiding it until it
cannot be avoided. We generally resemble Tolstoy's Ivan Illich:
The syllogism he had learned from Keizwetter's Logic "Caius
is a man, men are mortal, therefore Caius is mortal" always
seemed to him correct as applied to Caius, but certainly not
as applied to himself. That Caius-man in the abstract-was
mortal was perfectly correct, but he was not Caius, not an
abstract man, but a creature quite, quite separate from all
others. ,08
Tolstoy understood that the contemplation of the death of
others, however sad or even frightening, is simply not compa-
rable to the consideration of one's own death. And by exten-
sion, thinking, speaking, and planning for one's own death at
a time when it lies in the indefinite future may be closer to
facing the death of another than the death of the self. The
rational approach that we generally accept as the best way to
plan our lives calls on us to put aside emotion, to put aside the
sense of our own uniqueness, and to treat "ourselves in the
future" not as self, but as another. 09 Even if we sincerely try
to overcome this obstacle, we may not be successful. The person
actually facing death is not the same person as before; a new
set of perceptions and feelings that were previously unknown
are now part of his or her consciousness. These new perceptions
can cause profound changes in attitudes, as folk wisdom has
acknowledged for centuries:
The wretch who "called out every day/for death to come his
way" sends it back when it arrives. "Come no further, 0
death! 0 death, leave me alone."" 0
,09 L. TOLSTOY, THE DEATH OF IVAN ILLICH (1965), quoted and discussed in W.
BAuRREr, supra note 104, at 117-29.
,o1 The dangers of this objectification of self, especially of self in the future, is one
of the central themes of existentialist philosophy, particularly that of Martin Heidegger.
See R. OLsoN, supra note 4, especially at 197-201. See also Slote, supra note 102.
110 P. Aaaas, supra note 5, at 15. These attitudes are noted by Aries in ages that
he finds to be, overall, far more accepting of the reality of death than our own, as well
as in contemporary society.
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This is not to suggest that stubborn refusal to accept death
is the only possible, or even the most likely response to its
actual approach. But it surely does suggest that no response can
be said to be a genuinely informed one until the full reality of
the choice is present to the individual, that is, until death has
"come his way." This is also not necessarily to endorse the
position that medical treatment should never, or even rarely, be
withheld in cases involving patients with terminal illness who
are unable to make their own decisions when death is imminent.
It is, however, enough to cause serious doubt about the char-
acterization of prior directives made by the patient as clear
autonomous choices which, as examples of informed consent
made under optimal conditions for decisionmaking, should
clearly be followed out of respect for the patient's rights.
Therefore, prior declarations by the patient present serious
problems when we too easily regard them as clearly representing
the patient's choice at the time of actual decision concerning
the termination of care. If this is indeed the case, then how
much more serious are the problems caused by the classification
as the patient's own present choice of decisions made, not by
advance declarations, formal or informal, but rather by a third
party designated by the court, by statute, or by an advance
proxy appointment made by the patient? Although such deci-
sions may be made with some regard for the patient's unique
situation, the decision is much more a choice made by someone
other than the patient. Yet there remains a widespread refusal
to acknowledge this, and an insistence on describing the choices
as mere deference to the exercise of the patient's autonomous
decision."' A number of questions must be addressed. Why do
we see this insistence on classifying these decisions as autono-
mous choices to invoke individual rights despite the obvious
ways in which such a characterization is strained? How, if not
as the exercise of individual rights, should these decisions be
characterized? Are there preferable alternative views, or is the
autonomous rights model, despite its flaws, the best available?
And if there are preferable alternative ways to look at the
problem, how should that shift in viewpoint change the current
M See supra notes 9-85 and accompanying text.
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approach of courts and legislatures to the issues related to the
"right to die?"
III. TERMINATING MEDICAL CARE: THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE
COMMUNITY
The persistence of courts, legislatures, and commentators in
insisting that issues of terminating medical care are essentially
matters of discerning the autonomous choices of the patient is
not merely the product of a failure to recognize the flaws in
the use of such concepts. Kamisar's critique1 2 has been in print
for thirty years, and others have followed.1 3 The prevalent view
may be another example of an attitude quite common in Amer-
ican law with regard to the exercise of power over people.
Americans are both attracted to and afraid of the exercise of
power, and the law must somehow deal with this ambivalence
in its approaches to issues that directly deal with questions of
control over people's lives. Often, this dilemma will be resolved
by describing the choice to exercise power as not a choice at
all, but merely something the decision maker is compelled to
do, either by another decision maker or by circumstances be-
yond his control. The decision thus becomes more palatable,
not only to those directly affected and to a society ambivalent
about power, but also to the decision maker. The responsibility
of the decision maker for the harm done by the decision is
deflected, diffused, or eliminated altogether. Whether this is
done as a conscious strategy or a largely unconscious defense
against the pain of living with the consequences of one's own
actions is an interesting question, but the answer is less impor-
tant for our purposes than the recognition that this type of
denial does occur quite frequently. 114
112 Kamisar, supra note 12.
" See, e.g., Gelfand, supra note 32; Hunsaker, Unnatural Life v. Natural Death:
Some Legal and Ethical Considerations, 7 GEORGE MASON U. L. REv. 1 (1984).
114 The propriety of a legal decision maker choosing to deviate from outside
influences that could be said to "compel" a contrary decision is, of course, a central
question of legal philosophy. Compare R. DwoRsIN, LAw's Em.Pat (1986) with M.
KELMAN, A GUrDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STurnas (1987). But leaving the normative
question aside, it is clear that legal decision makers can, if they so choose, resist or at
least attempt to resist the most clear compulsion for one decision over another. See,
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Perhaps the most famous and possibly the most significant
example in American law of exercising power while insisting
that its exercise was not a matter of choice is Marbury v.
Madison."' John Marshall's defense of the power of judicial
review was couched in an elaborate argument that there was
simply no other way to resolve the dispute before him. But even
scholars who have no doubt that Marshall's decision was correct
see his protestations of having no choice in the matter as being
disingenuous." 6 Marshall could have avoided finding a conflict
between the statute before him and the Constitution through
interpretation,1 7 or he could have resolved the conflict by adopt-
ing the rule of deference to the legislature." 8 While such deci-
sions may have been wrong, they were actual options. The
rejection of those alternatives and the assertion of the power of
judicial review was a decision, not an inevitable occurrence." 9
In these efforts to avoid responsibility for the exercise of
power, the concept of a "right" can be of great value. One
need not accept the overall world view of the Critical Legal
e.g., Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala. 1983), rev'd in
part, 705 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1983), aff'd sub nom. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38
(1984). The existentialist philosopher would see the repression of the actual power to
diverge from outside expectations as part of the "anguish of freedom." See R. OLSON,
supra note 4, at 51-63.
M, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
116 See, e.g., Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE
L.J. 1; Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal
Courts, 1801-1835, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 646, 651-61 (1982).
"I See Van Alstyne, supra note 116, at 14-16; Currie, supra note 116, at 653-55.
The authors demonstrate that either the relevant portions of the Judiciary Act of 1789
or Article Ill of the Constitution could, quite rationally, be read in a way that would
make them entirely consistent.
HI The Supremacy Clause states that the Constitution is the supreme law of the
land, but it does not address the question of who decides whether its provisions conflict
with a government practice or statute. See Van Alstyne, supra note 116, at 22; see also
Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330 (Pa. 1825).
119 But it was a correct decision, even in the eyes of some who are skeptical about
whether it was faithful to the original understanding of the powers of the judicial
branch. See L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1-30 (1958). Of course, there is much
evidence that judicial review was contemplated by the framers. See THE FEDERALIST
No. 78 (A. Hamilton). Alexander Bickel thought that the framers' approval of judicial
review was "as clear as such matters can be." A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 15 (1962).
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Studies movement 120 to recognize the value of its insight that
the use of the term "right" may mask an exercise of power
over another in the guise of a mere logical conclusion from first
principles. 121 This is relatively clear in the many instances where
one party asserts the right to control another's behavior, and
the other person counters with a claim of right to be free from
such control. Since it is clear that we have a clash of interests,
there is little danger that we will misread the outcome. The
court will affirm the right of the winner and deny the right
asserted by the loser. Society, whether it agrees with the out-
come or not, will therefore have a good idea of who the winners
and losers are.
Somewhat more dangerous is the situation where the person
exercising power over another is able to characterize what is
happening as the vindication of the right of the person actually
being harmed by the decision. Possibly the clearest historical
example involved the constitutional challenges to early labor
laws. In invalidating such attempts to limit economic exploita-
tion of workers, courts would often speak not of the rights of
industry, but rather of the "right" of the worker to contract
freely for employment.: 'Thus the courts, and society if it were
so inclined, could rest easy, assured that they were not respon-
sible for the exploitation of labor. They had merely deferred to
the rights of the workers to make their own contracts. How
they used their rights might be unfortunate, but it was not
society's fault.
Similarly, the situation presented by a patient with a ter-
minal illness presents society with the need to make a decision,
to exercise power over the individual. That exercise of power
120 To the extent that the movement has a single "world view," see generally
Kelman, supra note 114. See also Critical Legal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REv.
1-674 (1984). While disagreeing among themselves, Critical Legal Studies scholars are
generally skeptical about the binding nature of rules, including widely accepted rules
affirming the sanctity of individual rights. Id.
" Indeed, the most prominent recent proponent of the concept that the termi-
nology of constitutional rights can be used to disempower others, that is, the majority,
was Robert Bork. See Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEx. L.J. 383
(1985).
'2 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Adkins v. Children's Hospital,
261 U.S. 525, 545 (1923).
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will be far less troubling to us if we think of it as not our
decision at all, but merely our response to the exercise of the
individual patient's rights. Adherents of the "right to die" can
recognize this clearly in the approach of courts who refuse to
accept the right.' 23 To keep a patient alive at all cost, despite
the existence of great pain, is a difficult decision. It can be
softened by the assertion that it is being done only to vindicate
the patient's right to live. Still, such a decision is not being
made by the individual but by those who have found themselves
with pover over the patient. Should the decision to terminate
treatment, under the same circumstances, also be seen as one
made by others rather than simply being a matter of deference
to the patient's rights?
Why is there such reluctance to recognize the extent to which
the decision to terminate treatment is a decision which others
make for the patient, and entails more than mere recognition
of the patient's autonomous rights? Beyond the general reluc-
tance to recognize our own exercises of power, the answer lies
in the nature of these particular decisions, and their implications
on a broad range of issues. As Richard Sherlock has pointed
out, the decision of whether, and under what circumstances, to
permit euthanasia requires some resolution of the question of
when a life is not worth living, and therefore not worth pre-
serving.' 24 To venture any answer at all, Sherlock contends,
threatens the most fundamental assumption of American liberal
democracy: the proposition that all are equal in the eyes of the
law.' 25 To designate some forms of human life as unworthy of
protection, or even to tolerate discussion of the question, then,
is to threaten that basic principle and all of the valuable prin-
ciples that flow from it.
The question seems too frightening to face, yet advances in
medical technology make facing it inevitable. One way to cut
123 See, e.g., Dr. Eric Cassell's comments on the way in which preserving a
patient's life can often lead to ignoring a person's autonomy, thereby interfering with
individual rights in order to protect what are essentially the values of the physician,
not the patient. Symposium Panel, supra note 1, at 501-07.
'1' Sherlock, Liberalism, Public Policy and the Life Not Worth Living: Abraham
Lincoln on Beneficent Euthanasia, 26 Am. J. Jusus. 47 (1981).
,2 Id. at 49-50.
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through this dilemma is to redefine terms so that a decision
seems to be no decision at all. The principle of individual
autonomy, and the right to structure one's own life, even fool-
ishly, is honored by almost all groups in the American political
community. Although strong disagreement exists over concrete
applications of the principle of liberty, in the abstract the con-
cept commands nearly universal respect. Thus, it is relatively
easy to convince ourselves that, faced with tragic choices, we
have merely to defer to individual decisions to avoid, as a
community, the need to face the question of the value of life,
or of certain forms of life. 126
Upon reflection, this model of mere deference to individual
wishes simply does not ring true in many "right to die" cases,
any more than it did in the early child labor cases. 127 As we
have already seen, the delegation of the decision to withhold
medical care to a relative or other proxy clearly makes the final
decision one made by someone other than the patient, regardless
of the solemn declarations of courts that the proxy decision
must be made in accord with the thoroughly speculative stan-
dard of what the patient would decide, if competent. The proxy
decision maker, not facing his or her own death, but the death
of another, will almost surely treat death as an objective, distant
thing. Yet the decision maker's task is to decide as if he were
the patient, that is, someone to whom death is a real, and very
subjective, presence. Even if the proxy decision maker quite
faithfully carries out detailed advance instructions executed by
the patient prior to the fatal illness, the patient was very much
a different person at that time. We simply cannot know, unless
the patient can tell us, what the actual approach of death has
done to his or her prior choice. 2 8
126 "[T]here must be an admission that there are some lives that are not worth
living anymore." Id. at 48.
'27 See Note, Child Labor Laws-Time to Grow Up, 59 MINN. L. REv. 575 (1975);
see also Stem, Smith & Doolittle, How Children Used to Work, 39 J. oF LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. no. 3, 93 (1975).
'12 A prior choice, because of its remoteness, is more like choosing for someone
else than for oneself here and now. The difference between speaking of self in an
objectified, abstract way and relating honestly to actual experience is discussed by Slote,
supra note 102, at 591-606.
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Of course, even aside from these problems, and even in
cases when the model of autonomous decision making seems
most compelling (that is, a present request by a competent
patient), is society free from responsibility in deciding to ratify
that choice? Sherlock writes:
First, consider the case of person A who asks someone else B
to aid him in bringing about his death (either passively or
actively). A's request must be acted on by B in order to be
successful. B must ratify A's decision. Now if B is a seriously
concerned moral agent he will not just blindly acquiesce in
any such request. He will independently evaluate what he as
a moral agent should do. Will not this decision by B neces-
sarily involve an assessment of A's condition, which of course
will largely determine the reasonableness of A's request? In
essence then are we not back with a judgment that A's life is
no longer worth living or, rather, more mildly, are we not
forced as independent moral agents to decide that it would be
reasonable for a person with A's condition to conclude that
life is no longer worth living?' 29
The "B" involved here can be seen to include not only the
individual charged with making the decision to terminate or to
continue treatment, but also the community which gives that
person immunity from the usual legal consequences that flow
from terminating the life of another. 130 Sherlock's own sugges-
tion for resolving the dilemma is to reinvigorate the often crit-
icized distinction between active and passive methods of
euthanasia. He contends that a decision "between hastening
death and only prolonging dying,"'' at least when made by the
patient when "actually dying in an irreversible process ' 132 can
accurately be seen as a decision that does not place a particular
value on life itself, but rather selects one of two available types
of life. It is, under such circumstances, "the choice to live in
one fashion, for one goal, and not another.' ' 33
'1 Sherlock, supra note 124, at 61-62.
110 Since this entails change in long-standing legal rules, it requires a "public
judgment." Id. at 49.
- Id. at 62.
£32 Id.
"3 Id. at 62-63.
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There is much to be said in favor of Sherlock's distinction,
but even if we follow his recommended course, we are still
engaging in some sort of social choice. The community often
prohibits individual choices "to live in one fashion ... and not
another." 3 4 Perhaps we should defer to these sort of "lifestyle"
choices but such a decision is not inevitable, and it does not
entirely avoid the "value of life" question. Surely, the decision
to acquiesce says something about our view of the extra time
on earth that the patient chooses to surrender. At the very least,
we are declaring skepticism over the value of that part of a life.
Whether characterized as a choice between life and death or
as a choice of ways to live, even those choices that most clearly
resemble other autonomous choices are not made by an individ-
ual who holds and has formed his views in a vacuum, but rather
by one who has been instructed by society as to the "proper"
way to face death. Phillippe Aries has described the evolution
of social attitudes toward death over the centuries. 135 Although
views of death have changed, at any given time there seems to
be some socially approved version of the proper way to face
death, which is communicated in one way or another to the
individual. The most obvious examples of this phenomenon
were the artes moriendi of the late Middle Ages, illustrated
instructional books teaching the art of dying well. l36While other
generations and cultures may not have been as direct as medieval
Europe, each culture teaches its version of a fitting death through
its art, symbols, and literature. 137
Not only does society teach the individual in advance, it
often supplies an audience when the time comes for the individ-
ual to apply those lessons. Before the twentieth century, the
134 Id.
"I P. ARms, supra note 5.
136 Id. at 107-10. These were profusely illustrated so that even the illiterate could
learn from them.
13, The artes moriendi underwent subtle changes through the years. See id. at 129-
30 and 303-05. The United States developed its own literature of the "beautiful death"
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See id. at 446-60. Aries agrees with
Lewis Saum that "during the first half of the nineteenth century the American sensibility
was dominated by death," id. at 446-47, as evidenced in private correspondence, and
in popular literature with titles such as Agnes and the Keys to Her Little Coffin,
Stepping Heaven-ward, and Our Children in Heaven, see id. at 450.
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ideal scene of death was one surrounded by people. Family,
friends, even strangers were there. Death was by no means an
event experienced only by its isolated victim: it was quite social.
At different times, the dying person might be seen as the pri-
mary actor in the drama, with others as his audience, 3 8 or as
an observer to a scene played out around him by others.'
39
Always, though, to the end, the dying person was relating to
others. Until the end, or at least until the loss of consciousness,
the dying person was aware of the social role he or she was
playing. The presence of others and what they all had learned
about death would influence death's victim to follow the script,
to follow the assigned role in the socially approved pageant of
death. 140
Present day artists continue to put forward visions of a
proper death. These need not, and do not, necessarily resemble
the peaceful death of earlier times. Dylan Thomas's urgings to
"rage against the dying of the light ' '141 are a far different type
of advice. Aries has described the typical death of the twentieth
century, a time which has seen an attempt to deny death, to
make it invisible: "[a] new image of death is forming: the ugly
M The earliest accounts of the proper way to die stress the acts of ceremony
performed by the dying person. See id. at 14-15 (account of the death of Roland). This
is also the attitude of much nineteenth century American death literature: "[T]he dying
man was expected to die well .... Death was still a spectacle of which the dying man
was the director." Id. at 447-50. Also, letters speak of how well or poorly dying
relatives played their roles in the drama. Id.
- "In his analysis of the icongraphy of the [fifteenth century] artes moriendi,
Alberto Teneti suggests that the dying man attends his own drama as a witness rather
than as an actor." Id. at 109. The drama rages around the dying man in his bedroom,
as Satan and the angels battled for his soul.
,,0 "According to custom, the bedroom is full of people, for one always dies in
public." Id. at 108.
To die surrounded by friends and relatives was a satisfaction. But to be
one of those surrounding his death ... was also a "privilege" . . . . It
was the duty of one of these privileged persons to be the indispensible
herald of death ... to warn the dying person in plain language. If the
dying man understood the warning and accepted it, he was "sensible"
but if not, he was "very stupid."
Id. at 448.
'"4 Thomas, Do Not Go Gentle into That Good Night, in D. THOMAS, DEATHS
AND ENTRANCES (1946).
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and hidden death, hidden because it is ugly and dirty."'' 42 But
even the "hidden" death, the death quite consciously removed
from the gaze of society, has social implications. The priviti-
zation of death reinforces the image of it as a matter for the
autonomous individual to deal with, something in which the
community has no role, even as observer.
In recent years, as the negative consequences of the denial
of death have become more clear, a new ars moriendi has
emerged. This *new way of confronting death has been both
individual and social. Dr. Elisabeth Kubler-Ross has been ex-
tremely influential in charting the typical history of a fatal
illness and the response of the terminal patient. From observa-
tion of dying patients, Dr. Kubler-Ross has asserted that such
patients progress through a series of psychological stages.' 43
Beginning with denial, the patient works through several inter-
mediate stages to the ultimate point of acceptance.'" While her
work, at least initially, was primarily descriptive rather than
prescriptive, it does seem clear that Dr. Kubler-Ross and her
disciples feel that this progression toward acceptance. of death
is what should happen, as well as what does happen. And not
only should the patient journey toward acceptance, but society
should also be supportive of this psychological journey. While
her writings and her clinical work are based upon observation
and are clearly sensitive to the individuality of the patient, it is
quite clear that Dr. Kubler-Ross has set forth a modern ars
moriendi, something which is at least seen as somewhat of an
instruction manual on the way a terminal patient should face
death. 45 As with the ancient artes, the individual is expected to
learn the "proper" response to the approach of death well
141 P. ARius, supra note 5, at 569. This twentieth-century attitude toward the
"dirty death," to conceal it, deny it, and privatize it, is seen by Aries as a sharp break
with all that has gone before.
"3 E. KUBLER-ROSs, supra note 106.
" Kubler-Ross has concluded that the terminally ill typically move from denial
to anger, to "bargaining" (with God or fate), to depression, to acceptance. Clearly
Dr. Kubler-Ross sees this as the proper stage at which to face the moment of death,
and she outlines ways for family and health care professionals to assist the patient
through these stages. Id. Once again, the patient and those closest to the patient fulfill
their roles in the drama of death.
"41 See D. HUMPHREY, LET ME DiE BEFORE I WAKE (1982) (more explicit modern
artes moriendi specifically addressed to the issue of voluntary euthanasia).
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ahead of time, so that he or she will play the part correctly
when the time comes. Once again, death will be a community
event; the patient will have an audience.
On a more explicitly social level, debate about the allocation
of scarce medical resources has led many to the conclusion that
society cannot continue to urge and support the choice of the
individual to "rage" against death regardless of the cost. For-
mer Colorado Governor Richard Lamm caused an uproar when
he suggested that the elderly might have a duty to forego ex-
pensive medical treatment intended to prolong their lives by
some brief span, in light of society's needs that may be neglected
if heavy resource commitments must be made to such treat-
ment.'4 While there is a vast and significant difference between
compulsion and influence, clearly the advocates of such a po-
sition are attempting to educate, to influence, and to condition
individuals so that when death approaches they will make the
"right" autonomous choice.
One way or the other, then, society will label certain types
of decisions about death as "right" and others as "wrong,"
some as courageous and noble, others as at least disappointing,
possibly cowardly, or even disgraceful. These social labels can-
not fail to influence subsequent individual choices. In addition,
such attitudes can cause decision makers to interpret the state-
ments and actions of the individual patient in ways that are at
least problematic. Possibly the most striking example of the
phenomenon is contained in the opinion of the California Court
of Appeal in Bartling v. Superior Court.147
Bartling petitioned the Superior Court for permission to
compel the withdrawal of life support equipment. Although he
died prior to the appeal of the lower court's denial of his
petition, the appellate court nevertheless reversed, in order "to
set forth a framework in which both the medical and legal
- See generally, Battin, Age Rationing and the Just Distribution of Health Care:
Is There a Duty to Die?, 97 ETamcs 317 (1987). Battin notes that this is hardly an
unprecedented suggestion. Societies and philosophers have suggested, with varying
degrees of directness and sensitivity, that at some point the aged infirm person has no
claim on society's resources.
47 209 Cal.Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984).
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professions can deal with similar situations."' 148 Although Bar-
tling's legal competency was undisputed, the hospital opposed
the petition, stating concern about the sincerity and finality of
Bartling's decision. Not only had Bartling made some statements
to the effect that he wanted to live and did not want his
respirator disconnected, but nurses also testified that on more
than one occasion "the ventilator tube [keeping him alive] ac-
cidentally detached and Mr. Bartling signalled frantically for
them to reconnect it. "149 The court held that the hospital should
have deferred to Bartling's desire to have his respirator discon-
nected. 150
In a rather remarkable sentence, the court dismissed as
insignificant "[t]he fact that Mr. Bartling periodically wavered
from his posture because of severe depression or for any other
reason."'' The court would persevere, even where Bartling has
wavered, and follow his true intent. But why should one of two
conflicting wishes be labelled true and the other a distortion
caused by depression or some other impediment to the ability
to choose well? If anything, isn't the wish to die more likely to
be a consequence of depression than the wish to live? And even
if the wish to live is influenced by emotion rather than pure
reason, why is emotion irrelevant, or worse, a distortion? The
answers to these questions seem painfully clear. When Bartling
chose to die, his decision was seen as proper, courageous, and
admirable. When he chose to live, his decision was seen as
unfortunate, almost cowardly. He had wavered from the socially
approved "script" for his death scene; he had forgotten the
current ars moriendi. The court would endorse his decision to
,,1 Id. at 221 (quoting Dority v. Superior Court, 193 Cal.Rptr. 288 (Ct. App.
1983)).
149 Id. at 223.
iSo Id.
' ' Id. The court focuses on his wavering in his resolve to determine that Bartling
was not legally incompetent. It seems to ignore entirely the significance of the wavering
in determining just what Bartling's fixed choice (if indeed he had made one) was.
Robert Twycross stresses the fact that requests for euthanasia are quite often actually
cries to be relieved of some other pain, physical or psychological. To see the request
for euthanasia as automatically the "true" request and the contrary evidence as the
result of pathology not only stands this finding on its head but relieves the physician
of his primary duty, to deal directly with the pain through some sort of therapy. See
Twycross, Voluntary Euthanasia, in Stncm AND EuTHaNAsiA, supra note 6, at 96-97.
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die, despite the moot nature of the case, and do so in the usual
judicial language of mere deference to Bartling's autonomous
decision. While the decision would not serve to end Bartling's
life, it would serve to continue the subtle process of promoting
the "proper" type of individual choice in the future.
Thus, even in those cases where the model of autonomous
decision making seems most compelling, that is, those involving
decisions by competent patients actually facing death, decisions
to withdraw treatment in cases of terminal illness are not made
apart from social attitudes on the subject. To continue to ad-
dress those issues as if they are, should be, or even could be
resolved merely by elaboration of and deference to an individual
"right to die" would be to continue to apply a flawed paradigm.
Decisions to withdraw treatment are not purely autonomous.
At the very least, they are decisions in which individual choice
is accompanied by social choice, a social choice which, as Sher-
lock has pointed out, requires confronting in some way the
momentous decision of when, if ever, a life has no value. 152
The fact that courts, legislatures, and commentators have
mischaracterized the issues before them does not necessarily
mean that their ultimate conclusions about whether care should
be terminated or continued are wrong. It does, however, compel
us to reexamine the validity of these conclusions with a new
awareness of the involvement of others in the "autonomous"
decisions being respected. While this may not require many
changes in rules of law, it will certainly require some changes
in the vocabulary that we use in analyzing and resolving these
issues.
How does current law with respect to the "right to die"
fare when seen as not responding to a set of decisions made by
isolated autonomous individuals, but rather to decisions inevi-
tably made with some degree of social choice inextricably linked
with individual preferences? Should current law be changed,
and if so, how drastically? And, finally, is there a case to be
made for retaining the language of autonomous decision mak-
ing, of the "right to die," despite the serious flaws? Even if
"I Sherlock, supra note 124, at 48-49.
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the "right to die" is somewhat of a myth, might it be a valuable
myth-one worth preserving?
IV. TERMINATING MEDICAL CAP E: RiGHTS AND
REsPoNsiBIUTES
The decision to withhold medical treatment is not, and
cannot be, solely the decision by an informed autonomous
individual. While the extent of involvement by others will vary
widely from case to case, this decision will always reflect some
mixture of individual and social choice. The first conclusion
from these premises is semantic, but like so many semantic
choices, has real consequences. The glib use of the term "right
to die" to cover the broad range of circumstances under which
decisions about medical treatment must be made should be
avoided. Not only does the term understate the importance of
community choice in these decisions, but in doing so, may
unduly influence those choices. Describing death as a right
makes it easier to make a decision to withhold treatment to
another. After all, we would merely be acting to carry out the
wishes of the unfortunate patient.
This is not to say that the wishes of the patient should be
disregarded, or even that there are no cases in which those
wishes should be decisive. Just as the termination is not properly
thought of as an entirely individual decision, neither is it entirely
a social decision. In some circumstances, the patient's expressed
wishes should override contrary choices of others, and in these
cases, some terminology of individual rights is appropriate. But
these cases are limited, and the terminology should be similarly
narrowed.
The situation in which reality most closely approximates the
model of autonomous decision making is the case of a compe-
tent patient who has been informed that he or she suffers from
a terminal disease, and who chooses what are generally termed
"passive" means of terminating treatment. Such a decision
comes as close as is possible to being purely that of the individ-
ual. Of course, even this choice is not made entirely without
social influence. The decision is made against the background
of society's attitude toward death, an attitude that has been
communicated, explicitly and implicitly, to the patient over a
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number of years. Most patients will, of course, be influenced
by social attitudes, but this is no more true here than in many
other situations where we leave ultimate choice to the individual.
No rights are exercised in a vacuum.
As critics have pointed out,' even in these cases, the pure
model of informed consent is flawed by imperfect information
about the future and by the pressure of physical and emotional
stress. Still, this also is no different from the circumstances
under which many other rights are exercised or waived. To
abandon rights terminology in these limited types of cases is to
call into question the validity of its use in legal thought at all.
History has shown that the ability to make the final decision
about certain things, despite necessarily imperfect information
and the influence of society's teachings about how that decision
should be made, is important in maintaining the proper balance
between social and individual choice.154 That the concept of
individual rights may be overstated or misused does not mean
that it is to be completely rejected, either in law generally, or
in this area in particular.
The language of individual rights, as well as its most com-
monly accepted consequences (that an individual decision should,
once it is found to be made by a competent actor under circum-
stances affording the best possible information, override any
contrary social decision), should be limited to this type of case.
Some statutes, most notably that of California,' 55 properly re-
strict the efficacy of written declarations to forego medical
procedures to decisions made by a competent patient after di-
agnosis of a terminal illness. Keeping in mind Sherlock's dis-
tinction between decisions whether to live and decisions how to
live, we should insist that this type of choice be labelled a right
to refuse medical treatment, rather than a "right to die." The
former term is far more neutral, and does not connote death
'" See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 12; Gelfand, supra note 32.
1 4 An extremely interesting debate on the value of antimajoritarian rights recently
took place in Canada, concerning its new constitutional Charter of Rights. For a
collection of viewpoints on the relative values of individual rights and parliamentary
(majoritarian) sovereignty, see the articles collected in 4 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1-350 (1982)
(special edition on the new Canadian Constitution).
" ' See supra notes 68-85 and accompanying text.
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as a positive thing. It is, therefore, less easily misused to disguise
the issues involved when the decision will not be made by the
individual as a matter of right, but must be made by others. 156
In all other cases, that is, all cases that do not involve a
decision to refuse treatment by a competent patient under di-
agnosis of terminal illness, we should abandon the language of
individual rights and accept the reality of the situation. Here,
those who are themselves not faced with the imminent approach
of death must make the ultimate decision about how to deal
with someone who is. When a judge, a relative, or a guardian
decides to terminate another's medical treatment, that person is
the one making the choice. The decision maker may well be
making that choice in a good faith attempt to act in the best
interests of the patient, but that is not the same thing as merely
giving voice to the patient's own choice. We must honestly
admit that the patient's own choice is unknowable.
This is true even in light of a prior declaration by the patient
of a wish not to be kept alive by extraordinary means. As
discussed above, when such a statement is made well in advance
of an actual confrontation with death, the declarant is too far
removed from the reality of the choice to be making a suffi-
ciently informed decision. The patient is thinking in terms of
how a hypothetical person should act when facing death. In
truth, the person is really making a decision for "another,"
that is, the person he or she will be at some indefinite time in
the future. 157
To abandon the language of the "right to die," and to limit
the concept of the right to refuse medical treatment to situations
actually resembling the circumstances under which individual
rights are validly exercised, does not necessarily lead to a juris-
prudence that requires that all available means be used to extend
life in all circumstances in which the right to refuse treatment
has not been exercised. It does, however, require that we face
the fact that those of us not on the verge of death are respon-
sible for making policies to be applied to those who are. As
long as we maintain that we can avoid these decisions by struc-
116 See supra notes 47-85 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
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turing the law so that we merely defer to the "autonomous"
choice of the patient, even when it is clear that no such auton-
omous choice exists, we will not confront questions that must
be faced. Questions of society's commitment to prolong each
individual life are important and even frightening. But they
must eventually be resolved, and conscious resolution is pref-
erable to a social policy that denies its nature as social policy.
In resolving individual cases, several claims carry some de-
gree of weight: the actual wishes of the patient, the actual wishes
of those closest to the patient, and the values of the larger
community. A possible fourth category of those involved in the
decision, the physicians involved, should not be seen as decision
makers themselves, except insofar as they also participate in the
articulation of society's values, along with others in the com-
munity. The physician's key role is not to resolve the dilemma,
but to supply the best possible information to be assessed by
those who do. When the wishes of the patient, those closest to
the patient, and the community are in accord, there is, of
course, little difficulty. Where there is some disagreement, the
relative weight of the three opinions should vary depending
upon circumstances.
As stated above, where the patient is competent, the pa-
tient's condition will lead to death in a reasonably short time,
and the patient has been informed of that prognosis, the pa-
tient's decision to terminate treatment should be respected. Here,
the use of the model of individual rights trumping contrary
social choices seems justified. "Living will" statutes limited to
these types of cases are proper. 15 8
Nevertheless, a few words of caution seem warranted even
in these cases. Any irreversible medical procedure should, if
based upon the patient's request, be taken only upon satisfac-
tory proof that the patient's decision is firm and neither ambiv-
alent nor overly deferential to the opinions of others. 159 Close
relatives should have the opportunity to establish, in expedited
proceedings, not that the patient is making the "wrong" choice,
but that the choice is based upon incorrect medical information,
- See supra notes 68-85 and accompanying text.
,59 See Battin, supra note 146, at 334-37.
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if such is the case. Even in cases where we properly respect an
individual choice, society should not be uninterested in the
circumstances under which the choice is made.
In all other cases, society is not merely deferring to an
individual right nor merely providing for "substituted judg-
ment" in the exercise of a patient's autonomy. Rather, it is
making a decision about the fate of one who cannot choose; it
is exercising power over the individual. This does not necessarily
mean that only general community sentiment is important, how-
ever. To state that a prior declaration of intent by the individual
should not be determinative is not to say that it is irrelevant.
Prior statements by the now incompetent patient should be given
some weight in the decision making process.
Just how heavily prior declarations should weigh will vary.
They should be given more weight in cases where they conflict
with the then prevalent views of the patient's relatives or of
society at large. In these cases the statements would seem to be
genuine products of individual choice, rather than mere echoes
of the preferred ars moriendi surrounding the individual. Where
the prior statement of the individual merely reflects prevailing
social attitudes, it is not only less necessary to use it to justify
a social choice, but it is far less certain that the prior statement
was made for reasons other than its social acceptability.
This creates something of a paradox. In the early years of
cases involving termination of medical treatment, a prior dec-
laration of a desire to avoid extraordinary means of life support
was inconsistent with a general social position favoring heroic
measures. Because it was contrary to public opinion, it deserved
serious consideration. But as such decisions have become more
common, and more acceptable, it is now possible that a prior
statement favoring treatment, rather than one rejecting it, de-
serves more respect. In other words, the statement that should
weigh heavily is neither the one favoring nor disfavoring treat-
ment, but rather the one disagreeing with the prevalent choice
of society on the question.
If society recognizes that it must articulate views on the
termination of medical cases and may not escape by merely
calling this a matter of individual choice, what will those views
be? It may be that the ultimate question of when to terminate
care will be answered no differently than it is now by courts
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employing the "right to die" label. A strong presumption in
favor of medical treatment will be overcome upon a showing
of an illness leading to death within a relatively short period of
time, with no reasonable hope of recovery and no expression
by the patient to indicate a desire for continued treatment. 160
But these similar outcomes will be seen for what they are, social
decisions.
Possibly, the "right to die," even if largely a myth, is a
myth that serves an important social purpose. Would recogni-
tion of the reality of social choice in these decisions give too
much impetus to the position that society may decide that
certain lives are not worth living? 16 After all, if society may
decide to keep individuals alive, regardless of their own wishes,
may it not decide to terminate care, regardless of contrary
individual choice?
It seems unlikely that this is the case. Denying the inevitable
social choice involved in decisions whether to terminate treat-
ment does not eliminate society's role. If anything, the myth of
the "right to die" makes a decision to disvalue individual lives
more likely by disguising its true nature. To frame a decision
to terminate treatment as mere deference to some hypothetical
individual choice merely makes the employment of community
values less obvious, less problematic, and easier for the decision
maker. Recognition of the social nature of the choice may make
disrespect for the life of the individual less likely. And clearly
limiting the scope of the individual right to terminate treatment
to those cases actually presenting circumstances conducive to
informed individual consent preserves an appropriate sphere in
which the individual's choice remains supreme.
The final part of the decision making calculus is the role of
those closest to the patient: spouse, children, or others. As
discussed above, the current trend is to delegate decision making
power to these people, but to label these decisions matters of
"substituted judgment," that is, the decision maker merely
making the patient's "own" decision for him or her. Once
- This seems to be a rough statement of the principles now applied in most
courts. See supra notes 23-67 and accompanying text.
162 See Sherlock, supra note 124.
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again, the concept of substituted judgment serves to mask the
extent to which the decision is being made by another. While it
may be far too cynical to dismiss a family member's assertion
that the patient "would have wanted it this way" as a disguise
for selfish considerations, it is also quite unrealistic to expect a
family member to make a decision about continuing medical
treatment without some consideration of his or her own values,
emotions and,. perhaps, practical concerns such as the financial
effect on the entire family of continued treatment.1 62 At best, a
decision by a relative will be made in the best interests of the
patient; it is not, however, that patient's decision, but that of
the decision maker.
A strong argument can be made that a delegation of decision
making power from society as a whole to a relative or other
surrogate is the best resolution of the question of where to
locate those decision making powers. Not only will this decen-
tralize ultimate decision making power, but it respects the gen-
uine interests of those closest to the patient. The costs of a
decision to continue or to terminate treatment are not spread
evenly throughout society. Inevitably, close family members will
disproportionately suffer the emotional consequences more in-
tensely, and unless and until society decides to assume the
financial burden for extended extraordinary care, close family
members will disproportionately bear the financial consequences
as well.
Still, the decision to delegate the power to either relatives
or other surrogates itself involves a social choice. While there
is a strong current of deference to family decision making in
American law,161 it is not nearly as strong as the rhetoric of
62 The financial burdens of extended care for a terminal patient are obvious and
often noted. See, e.g., Battin, supra note 146. But the psychological pressures of coping
with a dying person are just as severe, and the fact that the death of another will cause
different reactions in relatives is something that must be faced: "Dying people run the
gamut of all types of human beings, some likeable, some not .... Some dying persons
we will feel like helping, others not. The death of some people will cause us sorrow,
others who die will provide a sense of relief . *..." Pattison, Psychological Factors in
Coping With Dying, in DEATH AND DECIs1oN (AAAS Selected Symposium 18 E.
McMullen ed.) 45, 47 (1978).
163 See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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individual choice. Perhaps the wishes of the family should be
held in check to some extent. If the case for termination of
treatment is a close one by the standards of society, perhaps
the family's decision to terminate treatment should be decisive.
On the other hand, if by society's standards the decision would
clearly be to provide treatment, allowing the family to override
that choice is more problematic. If society would clearly wish
to terminate treatment, but the family wishes to continue it, the
willingness of the family to bear the practical and emotional
burdens of continued treatment may indicate that society should
defer.
Of course, society's claim to override the decisions of the
family become stronger if and when society assumes at least the
financial consequences of its decision. How health care re-
sources are to be allocated is a subject closely connected to
society's position on extraordinary medical treatment of termi-
nal patients. Here again, the connection between society, the
family, and the individual becomes clear. By deciding to fund
or not to fund treatment, the community seriously affects the
decisions of individuals and other groups. This is not improper,
it is inevitable. The entire community must be involved in
deciding how its resources are to be used.
In summary, the law should abandon the overbroad and
deceptive term "right to die." The more precise concept of a
right to terminate treatment should be retained only in cases
that resemble the exercise of other individual rights, that is, to
decisions made by a competent individual actually facing the
reality of a terminal illness. All other cases should be recognized
for what they are, situations in which society must make diffi-
cult, often tragic decisions about life and death. In some in-
stances, it might be proper for society to decide to delegate
those decisions to the family, but even in those cases, the
community is responsible for its decision to delegate. The care
of the terminally ill is at least as much a matter of community
responsibility as it is a matter of individual right.
CONCLUSION
Medical technology has forced the law to resolve questions
concerning termination of medical treatment to terminally ill
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patients by making largely social decisions involving our atti-
tudes toward life, and the ways in which society allocates re-
sources best to preserve it and its quality. Courts, legislators,
and commentators have attempted to avoid this fact. This avoid-
ance has taken place through the overexpansion of the concept
of an autonomous individual's "right to die," which renders
social decisions about the treatment of individuals no more than
a reaction to their own, often unexpressed, "wishes."
In some cases it is entirely appropriate to characterize a
decision to terminate treatment as the exercise of an individual
right. The terminology of individual rights should be limited to
those cases, and not used to disguise choices made by society,
or delegated by society to third parties such as relatives or
guardians. To disguise a social choice as one made by the
individual permits society to deny the consequences of its deci-
sion and may lead to social choices made with insufficient
reflection. Ultimately, the overextension of the model of indi-
vidual rights weakens respect for the concept in cases where it
is appropriate and realistic, that is, where decisions about an
individual's life are made by that individual under circumstances
actually facilitating informed autonomous choice.
To describe the position society should take on the question
of terminating treatment is beyond the scope of this Article. 164
It is entirely possible that the answers now being provided by
courts and legislatures to this ultimate question under the guise
of protecting the "right to die" will be substantially the same
answers provided when the question Is faced as one of social
choice. Whatever the ultimate resolution, it should be made
consciously, fully aware of the social nature of the choice. The
value of heroic measures to sustain life is not one that can be
entirely resolved by isolated individuals in solitary thought; it
also requires the community to confront its attitudes toward
164 The literature on the ultimate question of when, if ever, the decision maker
should decide to terminate care is extensive. In addition to the sources cited throughout
this Article, see D. CALAHAN, SETTING LrnTs: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING SOCmIT
(1987); P. RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE: MEDICAL AND LEGAL INTERSECTIONS
(1978); R. VEATCH, DEATH, DYING AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION (1976). For an
extensive bibliography on the subject, see THE HASTinGS CENTER'S BIBLIOGRAPHY OF
ETHICS, BIO)&EDICINE AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmIITY 28-38 (1984).
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life, death, and the allocation of resources in tragic situations.
Clarity about the limits of the concept of the rights of auton-
omous individuals can only lead to more responsible decision
making in situations where that concept is inadequate.

